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Reviewed by Zinaida Miller
How and why does a world in constant conﬂict come to appear as one of
legal, political, and economic order? In World of Struggle, David Kennedy argues
that people deploying the vocabularies of expertise shape the global order by
ﬁrst engaging in continuous, ruthless battles and subsequently hiding those
skirmishes from view. In the process, “struggle and distribution disappear
as experts embody the voice of reason and outcomes are assimilated as facts
rather than contestable choices” (5). In many arenas, those facts become
the hardened concrete of unequal distribution, a set of arrangements made
incontestable through invisibility: the obscurity of the expert decision-makers,
the rationalized language of decision, and the veiling of prior struggle in present
agreement work together to naturalize the status quo. In this ambitious and
far-reaching book, Kennedy reveals what is at stake in understanding struggle
and conﬂict as endemic rather than exceptional and in comprehending law
as a tool for distributing resources and power rather than an instrument “for
ordering, problem-solving, or expressing global values” (12).
Structured in three parts, the book ﬁrst analyzes global political economy
by focusing on how background ideas about economics and politics (as
well as about actors and structures) shape distributional outcomes and how
expert struggle (which blends “the saying, the insisting and the enforcing”
(54)) constitutes the world. In the second part, which examines particular
professions through their area of expertise, Kennedy explains how expert
knowledge “operates to constitute actors and shape structures” while serving
as an instrument of allocation (86). The ﬁnal part explores the multiple ways
in which international legal expertise simultaneously distributes and obscures
its distributive role. In World of Struggle, law plays a key role both as a ubiquitous
aspect of global struggles over authority and legitimacy and as a cautionary
tale about the inequality and injustice produced by systematically ignoring the
power of expertise.
Zinaida Miller is Assistant Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at
Seton Hall University. She thanks Aziza Ahmed, Robert Blecher, Karen Engle, and Lisa Kelly
for their insights.
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World of Struggle oﬀers both substantive and methodological interventions
in studies of global governance, expertise, international law, and political
economy. It is in many ways a culmination of Kennedy’s work over past
decades as well as a primer in the author’s eclectic method; it both revisits
and builds upon earlier themes and discussions. The book is preoccupied
not with experts as a group of individuals (Kennedy goes to some lengths to
explain that the experts themselves are only part of the story1) but rather with
expertise itself—or, perhaps more precisely, the project of deploying expert
languages in both their technical and vernacular forms. The book oﬀers a
self-consciously “mid-level” intervention that avoids causal explanation and
largely eschews agent/structure debates. Rather, the work focuses on how
those who use the language of expertise “see and create” the world (124),
how and over what they argue, whom they seek to persuade, how and where
coercion and persuasion meet or diverge, and how what begins as an argument
comes to be seen as a fact—and can, expertly, be reformulated once again as
argument (136). More than in any past work, Kennedy here takes his reader
through his own cartographic technique, tracing his eﬀorts to map the habits,
thoughts, consciousness, and actions of those who deploy expertise. In the
process, he demonstrates how the mobilization of expert knowledge entails
the production of decision and interpretation as fact and common sense.
Kennedy’s exploration of expertise also considers the capaciousness of the
vocabulary not only to encompass competing and contradictory arguments,
but to “straddle the technical and the political” (194). In parsing the experience
of expertise, Kennedy describes the allure and power of what he calls
“sophisticated disenchantment,” (194) a posture characterized by a peculiar
combination of faith and cynicism and a particular mechanism of diﬀusion.
Through this mechanism, an increasingly indeterminate expert vocabulary—
often expressed as or through law—becomes prevalent precisely by virtue of its
plasticity and malleability. Fields with staying power are those, like law, that
combine “complexity and fragmented loss of decisiveness” (153) and whose
practitioners are aware of “the diverse and contradictory quality” of the ethics,
materials, and institutions of their expertise (252). Kennedy writes early in
the book that “[i]n sophisticated and disenchanted ﬁelds, the vocabulary
deployed to make, defend, and interpret decisions is composed of arguments
that accommodate sharp disagreement and subtle compromise and in which
people seem both to be invested and to have lost faith” (9). He ﬁnds this same
fulcrum of conviction and doubt among multiple actors—including “lawyers,
economists, businesspeople, scholars and policy makers” (90)—and in diﬀerent
arenas, primarily international law, human rights, and economic development.
1.

“I use the terms ‘expert’ and ‘expertise’ with some hesitation because they focus attention
on a class of people and a kind of knowledge rather than a characteristic role and mode of
speaking, deciding and acting in struggle.” (3) See also p. 137 (“Although foreground players
might be thought to specialize in ‘broad debates’ while background experts tended to
‘technical argument,’ in contemporary global economic and political life everyone makes
arguments and accepts assertions of both types.”).
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Through this focus, Kennedy revisits ﬁelds that appeared in earlier works,
particularly The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (2005).
In this review I examine Kennedy’s notion of “sophisticated disenchantment” speciﬁcally as it functions within the “virtue ﬁelds” of humanitarian
and human rights, thus focusing on only one particular part of the worlds
and work of expertise depicted in World of Struggle. I do so by returning to Dark
Sides to reﬂect on the gaps and consistencies between the two works, published
twelve years apart.
Looking at the two works in tandem illuminates the images in each:
The picture painted in World of Struggle of human rights and humanitarian
professionals diﬀers subtly but markedly from that depicted in Dark Sides.
The human rights professionals of Dark Sides are unwitting perpetrators of
incidental harms whereas the experts in Struggle have incorporated doubt into
their daily practice. Comparing the two works raises the question: Did World
of Struggle represent a self-critique of earlier work, or did humanitarians take
up (indirectly) some version of the challenge to “disenchant [their] routine
humanitarian practices”2 and, in the process, become both more sophisticated
and more resistant to the deeper sense of responsibility in governance that
Kennedy calls for in both works?3
In Dark Sides, Kennedy argued that endemic blind spots and biases in
humanitarianism made it diﬃcult for practitioners to see the consequences of
their work. He began the book by cautioning:
The international humanitarians I have known rarely place the darker sides of
their endeavors center stage, where they can be assessed and either refuted or
taken into account in future work . . . . With so much evil out there to ﬁght,
it hardly seems worth it to focus on the downsides of the few humanitarian
practices which have been set in motion. But these darker sides can swamp
the beneﬁts of humanitarian work, and well-intentioned people can ﬁnd
themselves unwittingly entrenching the very things they have sought voice
to denounce.4

In this reading, the experts may be at times aware of the dark sides of their
work, but they avoid taking those consequences into account strategically. The
dark sides are marginal to the enchanted nature of the work; as a book, Dark
Sides thus focused on unintended consequences, blind spots, and biases. The
diagnosis was of an aversion to critique and pragmatism; the cure would come
through self-assessment, weighing of costs and beneﬁts, and an admission of
2.

DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM
xix (2004) [hereinafter DARK SIDES].

3.

As Karen Engle notes, Kennedy began to contemplate some of these questions already
in 2009. Karen Engle, Self-Critique, (Anti) Politics and Criminalization: Reflections on the History and
Trajectory of the Human Rights Movement, in NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 41, 47 (José María Beneyto & David Kennedy eds.,
2012).

4.

DARK SIDES, at xiii.
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responsibility for not just virtue but vice. More than once, Kennedy referred
to the need for humanitarian professionals to “disenchant” themselves and
their tools, always referring to the hope that such disenchantment would itself
produce a sense of responsibility, power, governance, and rulership.5 In many
ways, disenchantment is the key term of Dark Sides, the glue that holds together
the explorations of diﬀerent ﬁelds. In the ﬁnal pages of the book, Kennedy
calls for a new humanitarianism through that very process:
For the humanitarianism I imagine, we would need to disenchant our
practices, our expertise, and our professional postures, let go attachments
to much that humanitarianism has become. I have written about my own
experiences of disenchantment because I am convinced that for each of us
moments of decision, of responsibility and of freedom in unknowing, will
arise from our own moments of disenchantment . . . .6

Trenchant and provocative in 2004, such considerations seemed quickly to
have been internalized rather than rejected by those very same ﬁelds, perhaps
most directly the humanitarian aid and human rights enterprises. By the
mid- and certainly late 2000s, many humanitarian professionals, activists,
and experts openly articulated the critiques themselves.7 Revealing costs or
consequences was potentially less disruptive than it had initially appeared or
was hoped; pragmatically weighing upsides and downsides, acting without
total faith in the work, and using the ﬁelds’ tools without enchanting them
soon became tools of the trade themselves. To be involved in humanitarianism
was, itself, to be committed to incorporating and reconstructing the critiques
themselves—not perfectly or universally, but also neither sporadically nor
infrequently.
In recent years, scholars of humanitarian aid and human rights have
highlighted the propensity of those working in these ﬁelds to incorporate
the declaration of “dark sides” into their practices, to make it potentially
5.

Consider, for example, the following: “Perhaps we will learn to disenchant our routine, humanitarian
practices and understand the damage we sometimes do.” Id. at xix. On humanitarianism
writ large: “I am concerned to identify common assumptions or terms of reference which
blind policy makers to the consequences of their eﬀort, preventing them from viewing
their initiatives with cool, pragmatic eyes. But even when humanitarians are able to work
pragmatically, disenchanting their tools and entering the instrumental cost/beneﬁt world of
modern policy making at its best, problems can remain.” Id. at 114. On the law of war: “By
rooting out bias, disenchanting the doctrines and institutional tools which substitute for
analysis . . . we might achieve a humanitarianism which could throw light on its own dark
sides.” Id. at 309.

6.

Id. at 355.

7.

The change is even more evident in comparison with Kennedy’s much earlier foray into
ambivalence and ambiguity in human rights, a personal account of a human rights mission
to Uruguay in 1985, which was even more ambivalently received. That article was ﬁrst
accepted and then rejected by the Harvard Law Review, a change Kennedy later attributed
to the editors’ sense that such “moral ambiguity risked sacrilege.” DAVID KENNEDY, THE
RIGHTS OF SPRING: A MEMOIR OF INNOCENCE ABROAD 9 (2009).
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even a required aspect of the job.8 Human rights lawyers and activists
and humanitarian aid workers in the Israeli-Palestinian context provide a
particularly striking (but hardly unique) example.9 They have developed an
entire vocabulary for discussing the inevitable, inherent, and endemic bad
consequences of ostensibly virtuous work. Israeli human rights lawyers debate
the cost of legitimizing a broader system of oppression through their litigation
on behalf of individual clients.10 The justiﬁcations for continuing their
work despite the evident dark sides diﬀer depending upon the individuals,
nationalities, activities, and stakes involved, but in each case, their thinking
begins from the premise that their work actively facilitates the very system that
it aims to chasten, limit, or overturn.11 This thinking has now been woven into
their professional discourse: Articulating cynicism, bad faith, disenchantment,
dark sides, or consequences now represents a critical aspect of the work itself.
Foreign aid workers frequently voice the concern that their work subsidizes or
normalizes an occupation they normatively oppose.12 In a 2015 article, the U.S.
8.

Some years earlier, Alex de Waal had gestured already to the capacity of the humanitarian
aid ﬁeld to absorb critique in ways that embraced at best minor reform rather than
fundamental change. See ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES; POLITICS & THE DISASTER RELIEF
INDUSTRY IN AFRICA (1997). See also THE GOLDEN FLEECE: MANIPULATION AND INDEPENDENCE
IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION (Antonio Donini ed., 2012); MICHAEL BARNETT, EMPIRE OF
HUMANITY: A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIANISM 195–219 (2011). For a crucial engagement with
critiques of rights and human rights as a foundation for continuing human rights work and
litigation, see Karl Klare, Critical Perspectives on Social and Economic Rights, Democracy and Separation
of Powers, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: CRITICAL INQUIRIES
3–22 (Helena Alviar García, Karl Klare & Lucy A. Williams eds., 2015).

9.

For a related discussion, see Zinaida Miller, Perils of Parity: Palestine’s Permanent Transition, 47
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 331 (2014). For a discussion of both the special but also shared nature of
human rights lawyering in the Israeli-Palestinian context, see Daphna Golan & Zvika Orr,
Translating Human Rights of the “Enemy”: The Case of Israeli NGOs Defending Palestinian Rights, 46 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 781 (2012).

10.

Golan and Orr discuss a 2007 discussion hosted by the Association for Civil Rights in
Israel, in which leaders of major Israeli human rights organizations described their work as
rearranging the chairs on the Titanic or as a “ﬂy on the emperor’s nose” and asked whether
human rights litigation was in fact assisting the occupation. Golan & Orr, supra note 9, at
782.

11.

One leading Israeli human rights lawyer who has repeatedly grappled with these questions
summarized one of the dilemmas in a 2012 interview: “When you’re faced with a system
that’s systematically violating human rights, on a huge scope, is it right or wrong to sustain
internal, as opposed to external, resistance? Because when you resist from within, you
legitimise the system.” Michael Sfard, Is Israel on the High Road to Fascism?, 972 MAG. (Mar. 31,
2012), https://972mag.com/sfard/39804/ [https://perma.cc/XNT3-3DXS].

12.

See, e.g., Peter Hansen, The Response of Western Governments and the U.N. to the Humanitarian Crisis and
Its Political Implications, in THE POLITICS OF HUMANITARIANISM IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORIES: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Apr. 20-21,
2004, CD-ROM).
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executive director of the humanitarian organization Médecins sans Frontières
framed the dilemmas directly:
What our staﬀ sees, day in and day out, are the medical consequences of the
occupation. But while we can treat some of our patients’ symptoms, we can’t
alter the underlying causes of their suﬀering. And as the suﬀering has become
normalized, we have been questioning the wisdom of our presence. This is the
humanitarian’s dilemma: how to alleviate the suﬀering of a population while
not enabling the powers at the root of the pain.13

The repeated invocations of costs and dilemmas suggest less unintended
consequences than an uncertain and uneasy choice to carry on despite the
inevitable harm.
In a recent ethnography of the Palestinian human rights situation, Lori
Allen discusses cynicism and its uses in a context of ongoing conﬂict and
limited—if any—human rights victories.14 In speaking with Palestinian rights
workers, she found
widespread awareness of the systemic problems inherent in the human rights
industry as it developed after Oslo. Simply knowing that they were caught in
a structure built on crumbling, if not rotten, foundations, however, was not
enough to cause many to ﬂee it entirely. In the stories of human rights workers
that I recount . . . they describe their eﬀorts to sidestep the debris as they
ﬁgured out where to go next.15

In Allen’s reading, cynicism about human rights in a context of its continual
failure under occupation can be a productive “mode of understanding, a
location from which at least some people remain aloof from the power structures
that are trying to sweep them up.”16 Although the productive cynicism of
Palestinian human rights activists diﬀers from the confessional collaboration
of international aid workers or the existential dilemmas of Israeli human right
litigators, there are related links in the very stability of the machinery. Human
rights and humanitarian workers are well aware of the dark sides of their work;
their acknowledgment of harm becomes part of humanitarian expertise.
Kennedy’s call in Dark Sides for practitioners to pragmatically assess costs
and beneﬁts reads quite diﬀerently against the background of experts whose
declarations of dark sides operate as performative elements of the work itself.
In this sense, there was a parallel between Dark Sides and its own targets:
13.

Jason Cone, The Humanitarian’s Dilemma, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 15, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.
com/2015/07/15/the-humanitarians-dilemma-palestine-gaza-doctors-without-borders/
[https://perma.cc/L9UQ-NEQ3].

14.

LORI ALLEN, THE RISE AND FALL OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CYNICISM AND POLITICS IN OCCUPIED
PALESTINE 15 (2013) (“[H]uman rights has become the object and inspiration of cynicism
for many Palestinians, the result of years of unfulﬁlled promises, unregistered claims, and
unsuccessful battles for political change.”).

15.

Id. at 67.

16.

Id. at 16.
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human rights, particularly in its naming and shaming mode, often aimed at
remedy through revelation. Exposing abuse would contribute to its end. In an
ironic twist, parts of Dark Sides seemed to aim at something similar: remedying
blind faith through revelation and thus deepening the possibility for critique
to shatter rather than merely reform. Over the years, however, both human
rights abuses and the human rights enterprise remained entrenched and stable
even in the face of revelation and disclosure.
World of Struggle takes on this conundrum directly through the notion of
sophisticated disenchantment, making it central to the experience, discourse,
and practice of expertise. Contrary to his earlier calls to search out blind
spots and biases, here Kennedy suggests that in doing so, analysts might
“underestimate the ﬂexibility of expertise. . . . Opposing interests and ideas
really have been domesticated into their argumentative material” (161).
Whether in critique of his earlier argument or as a reﬂection of the changing
character of expertise in the twelve years between the two books, World of
Struggle uses the notion of sophisticated disenchantment to describe the ways
in which indeterminacy, indecision, and contradiction are both endemic to
expertise and foundational to its seductive appeal.
On this basis, Kennedy explores the ways in which experts speak through
a language of predictability, clarity, and consistent linkages between theories,
methods, doctrines, and outcomes even while remaining aware that other
experts will have an equally plausible set of counterarguments that link
method or doctrine to outcome diﬀerently (152). World of Struggle oﬀers an
expansive vision of a world in which expert knowledge and practice seek
less to escape or obscure their unintended consequences than to incorporate
them. Kennedy does not leave biases and blind spots behind; throughout
the book, he highlights the ways in which the practice of expertise relegates
interpretive choice and distribution to the background. But at the same time,
he contextualizes doing so as part of a life of “sophisticated disenchantment”
in which there is no ultimate faith without question but rather in which
questioning in a particular way has become part of faith.
In this sense, Kennedy suggests a spectrum of belief and unbelief, or faith
and its loss, rather than the binary that the terms might suggest. Experts in
his work do not precisely act in bad faith, nor have they lost faith; rather,
their faith has morphed, changed, and expanded through struggle. It is, as
Kennedy says, “an ecumenical, eclectic, and disenchanted faith”—and for that
reason, it is “astonishingly appealing” (20). Experts maintain the membership
in their guild by neither professing faith nor confessing its loss.
This analysis—and Kennedy’s particular “mid-level” approach—leaves open
questions about the experts themselves and the operation of this spectrum. For
example, How universal is the experience of sophisticated disenchantment?
Does it function diﬀerently for experts in, for example, ﬁnance than in the
“virtue ﬁelds” discussed above? Moreover, how does the vernacular of
expertise function diﬀerently for those embedded in one locale and for those
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transnational practitioners who move from place to place in a world they
understand as “globalized”?
Another way of considering this question is to ask who, precisely, is
included in this broad category of not just experts but all those who deploy the
language of expertise. Kennedy’s framework makes possible—and facilitates,
through his open attention to method here—ongoing and plural queries
about how diﬀerent professional communities relate to distribution and
decision-making.17 At the same time, it leaves open multiple sociological and
ethnographic questions. The expert experience of peace builders in eastern
Congo might be diﬀerent from that of those delivering aid in Afghanistan
or litigating human rights at the Israeli Supreme Court. Kennedy’s decision
to discuss a vernacular, attitude, and language rather than a particular group
or community suggests further fruitful inquiry into the conditions under
which communities of experts, advocates, and practitioners become—or resist
becoming—both sophisticated and disenchanted.
What has remained consistent from Dark Sides to World of Struggle is the plea
for attention to law’s role in distribution and for the greater responsibility
that comes with recognizing the character of one’s governance power. In his
discussion of international legal expertise in World of Struggle, Kennedy suggests
that “a kind of professional faith or practice of fealty . . . strengthens law’s
authority while weakening the profession’s sense of responsibility” (218). While
the experts of Struggle more comfortably inhabit ambivalence in a way that
reduces the “unintended” aspect of the consequences, the experts and activists
in both works govern from the background in a way that shies away from
acknowledging power. Much of what World of Struggle illuminates, particularly
in this dimension, are the reasons for the system’s stability. Exposing the dark
sides or asking experts to face the unintended consequences of their work—
critical activities that seemed at one time destined to change the way the world
worked—turned out to be part of the motor of continuity. It is a conundrum
with which Kennedy begins the book: The object is “not to foretell collapse,
but to explain the strange resilience of arrangements so many intuit to be
nearing their end” (16).
In exposing and challenging that “strange resilience,” World of Struggle
rests not only on Kennedy’s socio-legal investigations of expertise but on his
experiences as a teacher: “As a law professor, I train experts” (277). The book
begins and ends with the invocation and call to students and readers alike to
imagine today as “1648,” the year of the Peace of Westphalia and Kennedy’s
shorthand for a moment when the world can be remade. Yet, he also begins
17.

Levels of sophisticated disenchantment might diﬀer depending on a variety of circumstances.
For example, in her 2014 ethnography of international peace builders, Séverine Autesserre
reveals an industry built upon speciﬁc blind spots and biases, including dividing local from
foreign and masking the reproduction of inequality. SÉVERINE AUTESSERRE, PEACELAND:
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE EVERYDAY POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (2014).
Her work recalls one of the early, foundational critiques of the destruction unwittingly
wrought by the development enterprise. PETER UVIN, AIDING VIOLENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT
ENTERPRISE IN RWANDA (1998).
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and ends with a concern that even in the face of an urgent, 1648-like moment,
the response of his students (and others) remains one of ambivalent reform
that will simply “kick things down the road, manage expectations, and, by
rendering the problems sustainable, reaﬃrm the current distribution of
powers” (17).
Implicit here is a call to arms to teachers as well as to practitioners,
professionals, and students. The production of sophisticated disenchantment
occurs not only once a lawyer practices or a development practitioner reaches
“the ﬁeld,” but through a series of educational engagements that build their
expertise. Indeed, it is a key aspect of much professionalizing pedagogy and
apprenticeship, most obviously in law, to learn how to argue as if one believes
a particular position, while at the very same time displaying the knowledge
that it could plausibly be argued the opposite way. To do so requires enough
investment to advocate passionately and enough detachment to appropriately
accommodate counterargument. It breeds not loss of faith but a reformulated,
optimistic, reformist, pragmatic, ecumenical faith (20). The requirement to
internalize indeterminacy and to argue with certainty creates the foundation
for a lifetime of expert engagement, so that the “most accomplished experts
are not surprised—or troubled—by the uncertainty of their expertise. Often
they seem emboldened. People make strong arguments but seem to have lost
conﬁdence in the determinacy of their analytics. The odd thing is that it does
not seem to matter” (9–10).
Kennedy describes a world in which neither conﬂict nor argument
destabilizes expertise; rather, those arguments recur and reproduce based
on a “collective sensibility about what would ‘go too far’ ” (10). It is both in
and after school that experts learn those boundaries and govern through and
within them. Shared assumptions allow for arguments on the same terrain—
but the unspoken common sense underneath the assumptions makes it all
the more likely that even those seeking great change will fall back on familiar
reform agendas.
Given the tendency of hidden background decisions and dominant
scripts to reproduce inequality and injustice, what role should expertise play?
World of Struggle argues less for abandonment than reimagination. In this
work, Kennedy continues his long-term project of uncovering the hidden
implications of multiple mundane “expert” decisions that shape a paradoxical
world: one both unstable and unshakable. Here, ﬁnally, is the foundational
ambition of World of Struggle and its challenge to readers: to undo the hegemony
of common sense, to unlearn the boundaries of reason, to unsettle what has
seemingly been seamlessly resolved, to untell the familiar stories of binaries
and boundaries, to uncover the struggles that expertise obscures, and thus to
unleash the possibility of remaking the world.

